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ORIG INAL ART ICLE
Ideological Asymmetry in the Reach
of Pro-Russian Digital Disinformation
to United States Audiences
Frederik Hjorth & Rebecca Adler-Nissen
Department of Political Science, University of Copenhagen, 1353, Denmark
Despite concerns about the eﬀects of pro-Russian disinformation on Western public
opinion, evidence of its reach remains scarce. We hypothesize that conservative indivi-
duals will be more likely than liberals to be potentially exposed to pro-Russian disinfor-
mation in digital networks. We evaluate the hypothesis using a large data set of U.S.-
based Twitter users, testing how ideology is associated with disinformation about the
2014 crash of the MH17 aircraft over eastern Ukraine. We ﬁnd that potential exposure
to disinformation is concentrated among the most conservative individuals. Moving
from the most liberal to the most conservative individuals in the sample is associated
with a change in the conditional probability of potential exposure to disinformation
from 6.5% to 45.2%. We corroborate the ﬁnding using a second, validated data set on
individual party registration. The results indicate that the reach of online, pro-Russian
disinformation into U.S. audiences is distinctly ideologically asymmetric.
Keywords: Disinformation, Russia, Ideological Asymmetry, Social Media, Twitter.
doi:10.1093/joc/jqz006
The suspected hacking by Russian authorities or proxy actors in the 2016 U.S. presi-
dential election has highlighted ongoing eﬀorts by foreign actors to aﬀect domestic
politics in the United States and other Western societies using online tools. Long
before the 2016 hacks, one such tool, frequently applied by Russian authorities, has
been state-sponsored dezinformatsiya (disinformation), targeted at publics in
Western societies (Boghardt, 2009). While misinformation is typically deﬁned only
in terms of incorrectness, disinformation is understood here as false information
created for the strategic purpose of deceit. Disinformation thus shares an important
property with a related term, “fake news,” in that it is “intentionally and veriﬁably
false” (Allcott & Gentzkow, 2017, p. 213).
Disinformation can be presented in a standard news media format, as fake news
is; for example, pro-Russian disinformation is disseminated through news channels
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such as RT (formerly known as Russia Today) and Sputnik, but it can also be dis-
seminated through social media accounts (Kragh & Åsberg, 2017). In Western soci-
eties, these eﬀorts have been met with concern that the spread of pro-Russian
digital disinformation can erode support for national governments, aﬀect electoral
outcomes, and impact Western audiences’ views on foreign policy and international
security (Pomerantsev, 2015).
In spite of these concerns, there is, as of yet, only a modest amount of research
on how (if at all) pro-Russian online disinformation spreads to publics in Western
societies. Scholarly and media attention has tended to focus on the sources of pro-
Russian disinformation (Mejias & Vokuev, 2017) and the role of computational
propaganda, meaning automated “bots” and algorithms that can make a message go
viral (Woolley & Howard, 2016). In contrast, limited attention has been paid to the
reach of pro-Russian disinformation: that is, the nature and extent of its audience
online. Instead, discussion of pro-Russian disinformation tends to implicitly assume
that its reach is diﬀuse and pervasive. This lack of knowledge is paradoxical, given
that an estimate of the reach would be essential in accounting for its political and
societal consequences.
In this paper, we provide one of the ﬁrst systematic investigations into who is
most exposed to pro-Russian digital disinformation, focusing on U.S. audiences. We
characterized two large samples of U.S.-based Twitter users who are following those
Twitter accounts producing pro-Russian disinformation, dividing them in terms of
their political ideology and party registration, as compared to non-followers. The
paper uses the term “pro-Russian” to denote a pro-Kremlin stance: that is, support-
ive of the current Putin regime and its political interests. We focused on Twitter, as
it remains one of the most important sites for global struggles over truths in inter-
national conﬂicts. Moreover, fake news spread mainly through those social media
platforms that are also the main gateway to news in the United States and many
Western countries (for a critical evaluation of computational propaganda research’s
tendency to rely on Twitter data because of its availability, see Bolsover & Howard,
2017).
We took a case-based approach, studying the Twitter communication ﬂow sur-
rounding the crash of the Malaysia Airlines MH17 aircraft over eastern Ukraine on
17 July 2014. By linking U.S. Twitter accounts following communication about the
MH17 crash with data about user characteristics, we could characterize the ideologi-
cal and demographic proﬁles of the users most likely to follow accounts disseminat-
ing disinformation. Thus, unlike most studies that investigate disinformation based
on whether accounts have previously disseminated disinformation, we used a more
precise, content-based measure, operationalizing disinformation as information
explicitly rejecting Russian responsibility for the MH17 crash (or stating that
Ukraine was responsible). Our research question is as follows:
RQ: How does ideology condition potential exposure to online, pro-Russian
disinformation?
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We found that ideologically conservative users are signiﬁcantly more likely to
follow disinformation accounts, compared to liberal users. Corroborating this result,
we found evidence that followership of accounts spreading disinformation is associ-
ated with being a registered Republican.
This paper contributes to the existing literature by characterizing the ideological
distribution of the audience of a veriﬁable case of pro-Russian disinformation. To
our knowledge, we are the ﬁrst to provide evidence of ideological asymmetry in
exposure to online, pro-Russian disinformation. Badawy, Ferrara, and Lerman
(2018) have come closest, with a study of retweets of Russian trolls, which found
that conservatives retweeted Russian troll accounts 31 times more often than liberals
in the 2016 U.S. election campaign. In doing so, we connect the literature on digital
misinformation (e.g., Berinsky, 2017; Lewandowsky, Ecker, Seifert, Schwarz, &
Cook, 2012; Nyhan & Reiﬂer, 2010, 2015) with the political psychology literature on
ideological asymmetry (Jost, 2017), thus beginning to ﬁll one of the “key research
gaps” in studies of social media, polarization, and disinformation (Tucker et al.,
2018, p. 62). We also meet calls to examine how social media platforms disrupt tra-
ditional ﬂows of political communication from mainstream media to mass publics
(Entman & Usher, 2018). Our ﬁndings provide evidence of a political communica-
tion environment where high-inﬂuence accounts play a crucial role in disseminating
disinformation, in what resembles a two-step communication ﬂow (Katz &
Lazarsfeld, 1955). Our case also illustrates an important paradox: in this environ-
ment, information searches by politically engaged citizens, usually deemed dem-
ocratically desirable (e.g., Bennett & Iyengar, 2008), may, in some cases, diminish
rather than increase factual knowledge. We revisit this implication in the conclud-
ing section.
Our study also contributes to the literature on partisan selectivity in (online)
media use: that is, the tendency of media choice to reﬂect partisan or ideological
considerations (Iyengar & Hahn, 2009). Like previous studies, we found clear ideo-
logical divisions in the types of information consumed online, although our research
design cannot disentangle self-selected from inadvertent exposure. Lastly, the focus
on pro-Russian disinformation connects this study to literature on authoritarian
regimes’ use of social media, including direct censorship of posts with mobilizing
potential in China (King, Pan, & Roberts, 2013) and more subtle control through
“networked authoritarianism” in former Soviet regimes (Pearce & Kendzior, 2012).
In contrast to these studies, we highlight the downstream distribution of disinfor-
mation within audiences.
In the next section, we present our theoretical framework and develop a hypoth-
esis of the relationship between ideology and exposure to pro-Russian disinforma-
tion. We then describe the empirical case—the crash of the MH17 passenger
aircraft in 2014—followed by a presentation of our data and statistical approach.
We proceed to present and discuss the results of the study. Lastly, we suggest direc-
tions for future research and consider the broader implications of our ﬁndings.
170 Journal of Communication 69 (2019) 168–192






/joc/article-abstract/69/2/168/5425470 by guest on 01 M
ay 2019
Ideological asymmetries in the market for disinformation
In theorizing how ideology conditions an individual to potential exposure to pro-
Russian disinformation, we draw on a substantial literature in psychology, commu-
nication studies, and political science on ideologically driven selectivity in (online)
media exposure. While our design does not allow us to observe cognitive processes,
several ﬁndings within this literature provide theoretical grounds for expecting the
reach of pro-Russian disinformation to be asymmetrical, with respect to ideology.
First, consider the so-called “hostile media eﬀect” whereby partisans tend to per-
ceive media coverage as biased against their own viewpoint (Vallone, Ross, &
Lepper, 1985). Scholars have explained the eﬀect in terms of group psychology:
because information provided in media coverage may challenge the in-group’s per-
ceived ideological or moral superiority, individuals are motivated to denigrate cov-
erage as biased against their in-group (Ariyanto, Hornsey, & Gallois, 2007).
Supporting this intergroup explanation, Hartmann & Tanis (2013) show that the
hostile media eﬀect is stronger among individuals with higher group identiﬁcation
and a perception of their own group as socially subordinate.
The hostile media eﬀect provides a partial explanation for the widespread public
mistrust in mass media (Ladd, 2012). However, empirical studies of the phenome-
non ﬁnd that mistrust in the media is not evenly distributed across the ideological
spectrum. Instead, in the United States, conservatives consistently exhibit more mis-
trust in mass media (Eveland & Shah, 2003; Lee, 2010). As noted by Shin &
Thorson (2017), this asymmetry may reﬂect that statements made by conservatives
tend to fare worse in media fact checking.
One potential consequence of this ideologically asymmetric mistrust in mass
media could be that conservatives would tune out of news media consumption alto-
gether. However, the same mechanism driving denigration of traditional media
should also spur a need for an alternative platform that validates the in-group iden-
tity. Lending support to this hypothesis, existing research ﬁnds that mistrust in
media is indeed sharply diminished when the media source represents a salient
political in-group (Bolsen, Druckman, & Cook, 2014; Reid, 2012). This leads us to
expect conservatives, who are relatively more distrustful of traditional media
sources, to be relatively more likely to gravitate away from traditional media sources
and toward alternative sources.
Second, recent research has found that this greater motivation for ideologically
conformant information among conservatives is matched by available information
sources in the online sphere. Studying networks of politically engaged users on
Twitter, Boutyline & Willer (2017) found that conservatives are more likely than
liberals to select into ideologically homogeneous networks. Studying Twitter-based
news media that propagate conspiracy theories about mass shooting events,
Starbird (2017) documented an “alternative media ecosystem” with a striking ideo-
logical slant: out of 44 media domains coded as politically slanted, Starbird coded
half as belonging to the “alt-right,” seven as “anti-globalist,” and just four as “alt-
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left.” Further, Starbird (2017, p. 8) found that two of the news sources identiﬁed in
her sample of domains were “clearly Russian Propaganda”; several of the other
sources produced strongly pro-Russian content, a theme that was most widespread
among the alt-right domains. This suggested a non-negligible overlap between pro-
Russian news sources and sources of dis- and misinformation on Twitter.
Based on these theoretical assumptions and empirical results, we expect conser-
vatives to be more likely than liberals to follow online sources of disinformation.
We refer to this as the ideological asymmetry hypothesis: compared to liberal
accounts, conservative accounts are more likely to follow accounts disseminating
pro-Russian disinformation.
As outlined above, the ideological asymmetry hypothesis follows from
“demand-side” factors (i.e., individual, social-cognitive motives for seeking out
alternative, ideologically conformant news sources), as well as “supply-side” factors
(i.e., the availability of online news sources catering to this demand). Here, we fol-
low Theocharis, Barberá, Fazekas, Popa, and Parnet (2016) in theorizing the observ-
able patterns as an interplay between supply- and demand-side factors. As a
consequence, we remain agnostic in this study as to which side of the two takes
causal precedence (for a discussion of whether polarization causes partisan selective
exposure or vice versa, see Stroud, 2010).
Case selection
A fundamental problem in any observational study of disinformation is measure-
ment. The most common method to measure online disinformation is by attribut-
ing it to a particular source (i.e., accounts or outlets), the output of which is then
assumed to be disinformation (e.g., Fletcher et al., 2018; Starbird, 2017). However,
not all information spread by these sources is—strictly speaking—disinformation.
Measuring disinformation by content raises another problem, intrinsic to the nature
of disinformation: the diﬃculty of assessing the veracity of any given, minimally
plausible statement prima facie is precisely what makes disinformation potentially
eﬀective.
We took a case-based approach to the study of disinformation. Instead of char-
acterizing disinformation by sources or in the abstract, we selected a concrete case
where identifying disinformation is feasible in retrospect. Speciﬁcally, we studied
the information ﬂow after the crash of the Malaysia Airlines MH17 aircraft over
eastern Ukraine in July 2014.
Two major concerns guided this case selection. First, the MH17 crash was politi-
cally signiﬁcant. The downing of MH17 was not merely a tragedy attracting global
attention, it also helped turn the Ukrainian crisis into a veritable international con-
ﬂict and prompted the European Union and North Atlantic Treaty Organization to
establish tougher sanctions against Russia (Golovchenko et al., 2018). For Ukraine
and Russia, embroiled in a war over control of Crimea, assuming responsibility for
the downing of the plane would have been severely damaging to either country’s
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political standing. Second, studying disinformation in the context of the MH17
crash is analytically tractable. Because of the political signiﬁcance of responsibility
for the crash, discussion about the crash hinged on who shot down the plane.
Hence, most communication in both traditional media and on online platforms dis-
cussing the causes of the crash took a clear stand on the question of political respon-
sibility. In the context of pro-Russian disinformation writ large, we consider the
MH17 crash a pertinent, empirical case in which online pro-Russian disinformation
demonstrably occurred.
Much attention has been devoted to how Russia fuels already-polarized debates
within the West by, for instance, prior to elections in Western countries, buying
Facebook ads discussing race or crime issues. In contrast, the MH17 case was
embedded in a broader geopolitical context of competing pro-Russian and pro-
Western narratives. The MH17 case shares this geopolitical aspect with the annex-
ation of Crimea in January 2014 (involving pro-Russian disinformation about the
presence of Russian troops in Crimea) and the missile strike against a Syrian air
base in April 2017 (involving pro-Russian claims that the strike was a U.S.-staged
hoax). What these cases of pro-Russian disinformation have in common is that they
discussed responsibility for particular international events or atrocities, demonstrat-
ing in each case that Russia was innocent and the West was culpable. However, the
MH17 crash is distinct, in that it became an instant global tragedy, killing all 298
people on board (including 193 Dutch, 43 Malaysian, 27 Australian, 12 Indonesian,
and 10 British passengers, as well as 13 citizens with other nationalities). As such, it
was likely to generate more attention in the West than other issues involving Russia
and its geopolitical interests.
The MH17 crash
At around 1:20 PM local time on 17 July 2014, the Malaysia Airlines aircraft MH17
from Amsterdam to Kuala Lumpur crashed near the city of Torez in Donetsk
Oblast, eastern Ukraine. The plane carried 283 passengers and 15 crew members, all
of whom died in the crash (Dutch Safety Board, 2015). Discussion of the crash on
social media began shortly after the crash. The earliest relevant tweet in our data is
from 3:13:58 PM, less than two hours after the crash, which read
“#BREAKINGNEWS MALAYSIA AIRLINES FLIGHT #MH17 CONFIRMED SHOT
DOWN OVER #DONETSK OBLAST, SHORTLY BEFORE REACHING RUSSIAN
AIR SPACE.” From then, discussion spread rapidly; over the following hour, more
than 10,000 tweets in our sample alone discussed the crash.
In assessing the key facts of the case, we relied on the report of the Dutch Safety
Board (DSB; the Dutch government agency charged with investigating the crash),
published in October 2015. The report concluded that the MH17 was shot down
with a Buk 9M38 missile, ﬁred from an area southeast of Torez, a town in Crimea
that was controlled by pro-Russian separatists at the time (Dutch Safety Board,
2015, p. 144). In 2018, the Dutch-led Joint Investigation Force conﬁrmed that the
aircraft was shot down by a launcher belonging to Russia’s 53rd anti-aircraft missile
173Journal of Communication 69 (2019) 168–192
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brigade (Joint Investigation Team, 2018). Russian authorities and Russian state–
sponsored and mainstream media continue to claim that the MH17 was shot down
by a Ukrainian military aircraft in an air-to-air strike, a scenario the DSB explicitly
rules out (Joint Investigation Team, 2018, p. 128). Based on these facts, we con-
sidered as a ground truth that pro-Russian separatists, with the help of Russia, were
responsible for the downing of the MH17, and we considered attempts to argue oth-
erwise as disinformation. In the next section, we explain how we built on this case
selection strategy to measure observable instances of disinformation.
Methods and data
In November 2016, we collected a sample of tweets based on a set of MH17-
relevant keywords dating from 10 July 2014 (i.e., a week before the crash) until the
time of data collection. The keywords and hashtags included in the search query
were MH17, малазийский Боинг (meaning “Malaysian Boeing,” and often used in
Russian media to refer to the aircraft), #MH17, #Pray4MH17, and #PrayforMH17.
The hashtags and keywords were selected so they clearly related to the crash of
MH17 (and not the Ukraine crisis more generally), they were neither pro-Ukrainian
or pro-Russian by nature, and they covered the major languages in which the debate
over MH17 took place. The aim was to get a broad representation of tweets from
both the pro-Ukrainian and the pro-Russian sides. We collected the tweets from the
Twitter Gardenhose, a 10% random sample of the full Twitter stream, ensuring a
representative sample of tweets matching the search constraints. In the following,
we refer to this data set as the tweet sample. The tweet sample contains a total of
481,567 tweets. Coming from the Gardenhose, this sample of tweets is not exhaus-
tive of the full universe of MH17-relevant tweets. Furthermore, the sample reﬂects
the keywords included in the search query, the optimal selection of which is not, ex
ante, well-deﬁned (King, Lam, & Roberts, 2017). These caveats notwithstanding, we
consider the tweet sample to be reasonably comprehensive and representative of the
population of interest: that is, the full set of MH17-relevant tweets.
Linking tweets and audiences
In this analysis, we refer to followers of accounts spreading pro-Russian disinforma-
tion as having potential exposure to disinformation. While we cannot know whether
actual users in the follower set saw the MH17 coverage contained in the tweet sub-
sample, they were potentially exposed to it, insofar as the tweet would have
appeared on their Twitter home timeline. As a passive measure of media exposure,
the content of a Twitter user’s timeline eschews the problems of recall errors and
social desirability bias that typically plague measures based on self-reports (Prior,
2009). On the other hand, passive measures do not directly measure exposure
(Vreese & Neijens, 2016). This measurement problem is compounded on social
media, where a given user’s actual exposure to an account in her network depends
on how many other accounts she follows, as well as the frequency and timing of
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activity from each account, relative to her own usage. To keep this distinction
between following and actual exposure salient, we refer to users’ exposure to disin-
formation as potential exposure throughout.
Another important caveat in this context is that the queries in November 2016
retrieved each accounts’ set of followers at that time, not at the time of the original
tweet. In order to evaluate the consequences of this discrepancy, we present an anal-
ysis in the Supplementary Appendix C, exploiting information about follower
sequences, available from Twitter’s application programming interface. We found
that our results cannot be explained by changes in the ideological composition of
followers over time. We revisit the issue of this time gap in measurement in the con-
cluding section.
We now faced two additional tasks: identifying disinformation within the tweet
sample, and learning how potential exposure to disinformation is related to user
characteristics.
Identifying disinformation
We identiﬁed disinformation by ﬁrst drawing a random sample of 10,000 English-
language tweets from the tweet sample. In the following, we refer to this as the tweet
subsample. The tweet subsample is, thus, representative of English-language tweets
in the full tweet sample. To the best of our knowledge, there exists no study investi-
gating diﬀerences between English-, Spanish-, or French-speaking, U.S.-based
Twitter users. In general, scholars exploring the demographics of U.S. users do not
pay attention to languages, which poses problems of external validation. Given that
the dominant non-English languages in our tweet sample are Dutch, Russian,
German, and Indonesian, with very few in Spanish, we deemed the issue of non-
English, U.S.-based tweets to be minimal in this particular case.
We manually coded the entire tweet subsample for whether each tweet con-
tained disinformation. Although ideally we might have used the hand-coded sub-
sample to train a statistical learning model to classify all of the 471,567 tweets in the
remaining tweet sample, we found that, in this case, standard classiﬁers had insuﬃ-
cient precision and recall to be useful. For this reason, we focused on the subsample,
where the content of each tweet was known. As a consequence, our inferences in
the following relate to English-language, online, pro-Russian disinformation.
Table 1 presents the categories used in the manual coding, the proportions of
tweets assigned to each category, and examples of tweets from each category.
The manual coding involved four coders, assigning tweets to one of three cate-
gories. Pro-Russia tweets (Category 1) explicitly stated that Russia was not responsi-
ble for the MH17 crash (or that Ukraine was responsible). Pro-Ukraine tweets
(Category 2) explicitly stated that Ukraine was not responsible (or that Russia was).
Lastly, “Other” tweets (Category 3) involved neither of these statements. We
assigned each of the four coders a quarter of the subsample, plus a shared subset of
100 tweets, used for assessing intercoder reliability. Intercoder reliability in this
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shared subset was high (Cohen’s κ = . 8, Krippendorﬀ’s α =& &. 78). See
Supplementary Appendix A for the codebook.
By relying primarily on the DSB report, we allowed for the fact that some of the
messaging we labeled as disinformation occurred prior to the publication of the
report. While U.S. oﬃcials conﬁrmed, only days after the crash, that Russia was
implicated (Ackerman & Walker, 2014), 86% of the tweets in the tweet sample were
posted prior to the publication of the ﬁnal report on 13 October 2015. Our classiﬁ-
cation of tweets is thus, in some cases, post hoc, as the truth value of the tweets may
not have been veriﬁable at the time. Since our deﬁnition of pro-Russian disinforma-
tion relates to the facts of the case, not to what was publicly known at the time, this
does not aﬀect our classiﬁcation. Still, this is an important contextual feature.
As shown in the “Proportion” column in Table 1, the vast majority of tweets
(84%) were assigned to the Other category. This reﬂects two important features of
the coding. First, most tweets simply tended to be expressions of grief or
Table 1 Coding Categories and Examples for Sample of MH17 Tweets
Category Proportion Examples Recoded
1: Pro-Russia 5.5% · Detailed analysis: MH17 shot down
by Ukrainian SU-25 cannon ﬁre and
air-to-air missile
· Why the USA and Ukraine, NOT
Russia, were probably behind the
shooting down of ﬂight #MH17
· Moral Terror: How Critics of
Western MH17 Coverage Are Bullied
Into Silence
Disinformation (1)
2: Pro-Ukraine 10.3% · RT @KiritRadia: Ukraine’s PM says
they’ll get the “bastards” who shot
down #MH17
· Video—Missile that downed MH17
‘was brought in from Russia’
@peterlane5news
· RT @mashable: Ukraine: Audio
recordings show pro-Russian rebels
tried to hide #MH17 black boxes.
Non-disinformation
(2+3)
3: Other 84.1% · #PrayForMH17 :(
· AIDS conference honours lost
colleagues #MH17
· RT @deserto_fox: Russian terrorist
stole wedding ring from dead
passenger #MH17
Proportions sum to less than 100 pct. due to rounding.
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compassion over those killed in the crash (like the ﬁrst example) or matter-of-fact
news headlines (like the second example). In other words, the vast majority of
tweets contained no statement as to who bore responsibility for the crash. Second,
the proportion of tweets in the Other category also reﬂects a deliberately narrow
coding scheme. Tweets were assigned to the Other category if they did not clearly
imply culpability for the MH17 crash.
The third example shown in Table 1 for the other category exempliﬁes this cod-
ing strategy. The tweet, referring to Russians stealing jewelry from MH17 passen-
gers’ corpses, clearly portrayed Russians negatively. But since it did not imply
responsibility for the crash, it was assigned to Other. Thus, the coding strategy pri-
oritized precision over recall and our estimated share of pro-Russian disinformation
in the hand-coded subsample should be considered a lower-bound estimate.
To simplify the analysis below, we relied on a recoding of these categories,
shown in the “Recoded” column in Table 1. For reasons described above, we classi-
ﬁed the Pro-Russian tweets implying no Russian responsibility as “Disinformation.”
Tweets from the other two categories were coded as “Non-disinformation.” The
labeling of the second category is deliberately residual and, admittedly, somewhat
awkward. To be sure, the recoded Non-disinformation category contained not only
true statements about the causes of the MH17 crash, but also emotional expressions
and, crucially, in all likelihood, disinformation about other phenomena. However,
the category of interest is the Disinformation category, containing only the small
proportion of tweets we know with high certainty contained disinformation. With
the narrow deﬁnition of disinformation, we thus opted to tolerate some false nega-
tives in the residual category, in exchange for minimizing the number of false posi-
tives in the category of interest.
Measuring user characteristics
The population of interest was the set of users consuming disinformation. In order
to arrive at a sample of this population consisting of individuals who potentially
were exposed to coverage or discussion of the MH17 crash on Twitter, we retrieved
every Twitter follower of one or more of the accounts included in the tweet subsam-
ple for whom data was available. We did so by querying Twitter’s REST API, which
collects data on Twitter users’ networks. The 10,000 tweets in the tweet subsample
came from 8,575 unique users, 1,345 of whom had protected or expired accounts.
We retrieved a full list of followers for the remaining 7,230 accounts. These
accounts had a total of 12,552,843 unique followers. We refer to this set of users as
the follower set.
The follower set contains the user identiﬁcations of the roughly 12.6 million
accounts following one or more of the accounts in the tweet subsample. We
matched these user identiﬁcations with information about other characteristics of
Twitter users from two other data sources. Figure 1 visualizes the relationships
between the tweet subsample, the follower set, and the two other data sources.
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First, we matched the follower set with data on the estimated ideology of 12.4
million Twitter users, presented in further detail in Barberá, Jost, Nagler, Tucker,
and Bonneau (2015). The data set, collected from 2012–2014, includes U.S.-based
Twitter users who engaged in discussions of salient contemporary issues, and is
restricted to users following ﬁve or more political accounts. Based on these followed
accounts, user ideology was then estimated using a variation of the procedure pre-
sented in Barberá (2015). This procedure, relying on a correspondence analysis
(Greenacre, 1993), estimated users as liberal or conservative, based on whether they
followed liberal or conservative accounts. For a recent validation of this ideology
measure, see Rivero (2017), though see Bauer, Barberá, Ackermann, and Venetz
(2017) for a critique of unidimensional measures of ideology. We refer to this data
set as the user ideology set.
An important limitation of the user ideology set is that it may contain auto-
mated accounts built to mimic real users: that is, bots (Howard, Wooley, & Calo,
2018). Since bots will often, by design, follow several political accounts, they would
be assigned an ideology score, potentially confounding the results. To address this
issue, we also matched the follower set with a data set estimating the characteristics
of 441,000 validated accounts of U.S. citizens. This data set, presented in further
detail in Barberá (2016), included Twitter users matched by name, home state, and
county (inferred from geolocated tweets) to U.S. citizens in public voter ﬁles. Since
the accounts were matched with real individuals, results using this data set could
not be confounded by anonymous or pseudonymous bots. The validity of the data
could, theoretically, be challenged by the large-scale impersonation of real U.S.
voters using names from voter ﬁles, combined with fabricated geolocation data
matched to voters’ home counties: a scenario we consider unlikely. The matching
procedure produced estimates of each individual’s gender, age, and, most impor-
tantly, party registration. We refer to this data set as the user demographics set.
Because some demographic information is imputed, all variables were rescaled to
range from 0 to 1, where 0 or 1 indicates that category membership (i.e., male,
white, low-income, etc.) is known, and intervening values indicate an estimated
probability of membership. Our key measure of interest, party registration, was
drawn from the voter ﬁle and, thus, has low measurement error. Though analyti-
cally distinct from ideology, party registration is strongly correlated with ideology in
the U.S. context (Levendusky, 2009), and we used it to corroborate the ﬁnding for
ideology. In the interest of completeness, we present the results for age and gender
alongside party registration, but note that for these variables, a measurement error
is likely to attenuate the observed relationships. See Supplementary Appendix D for
summary statistics for the variables in each data set used in the analysis.
As illustrated in Figure 1, there is limited overlap between the follower set and
the user ideology and demographics sets. This is to be expected, since the data sets
came from entirely diﬀerent sampling procedures, and we used data only on fol-
lowers of the tweet subsample. Furthermore, while the follower set contained a
diverse set of accounts following English-language tweets about MH17, the user
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ideology and demographics sets were restricted to U.S.-based Twitter-users.
Nevertheless, there was suﬃcient overlap such that an analysis of how ideology and
demographics are associated with exposure to disinformation was feasible. Since the
tweet subsample was randomly drawn from the full tweet sample, the sampling step
resulted in less overlap between the sets (and, in turn, less statistical power), but did
not bias our estimates.
For users in the intersections of these sets, we thus had information about ideol-
ogy/demographics, as well as potential exposure to (dis)information. However, it is
not realistic to assume that inclusion in the intersection was random. Individuals
who followed Twitter discussions of the MH17 crash were likely to diﬀer systemati-
cally from those who did not. In order to assess how observable characteristics are
associated with exposure to information about the MH17 crash, we therefore mod-
elled inclusion in the non-overlapping parts of the known ideology and demo-
graphics sets (i.e., the outermost parts of the dark circles in Figure 1) as a separate
outcome. We can think of these users as individuals who had no observable poten-
tial exposure to information about MH17, of any type. Each user in the user ideol-
ogy and demographics sets is then associated with one of the three outcomes in
Table 1 above: no information, that is, not overlapping with the follower set; disin-
formation; and non-disinformation. While the analyses thus cover the entire ideol-
ogy and demographics sets, we stress that the observed relationships may not hold
for exposure to other cases among users in the non-overlapping subsets.
Statistical approach
For the 12.4 million users in the user ideology set, we estimated the following
equation:
Follower set (12.6M) User ideology set (12.4M)
User demographics set (441k)
1.6M
17k 29k
Figure 1 Overview of types of data and sizes of their intersections.
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= ( + ) ( )Info f Ideology Ideology 1i i i
2
Where Infoi is a categorical measure of the outcomes described above for user i, and
Ideologyi is the estimated ideology for user i. We included a squared term for ideol-
ogy to allow for a nonlinear functional form, such as similar outcomes at the ideo-
logical extremes. If the true relationship between ideology and potential exposure
were U-shaped, a linear speciﬁcation would misleadingly indicate no association.
Since the dependent variable, Infoi, can take three categorical values—No informa-
tion, Disinformation, or Non-disinformation—we estimated (⋅)f using multinomial
logit.
For the 441,000 users in the known demographics set, we estimated the follow-
ing equation:
= ( + + ) ( )Info f Republican Age plus Male40 2i i i i
Where the right-hand side variables are indicators for being a registered Republican
(relative to Independent or Democrat), 40 years old or more (relative to being youn-
ger), and male (relative to female). As above, we estimated (⋅)f using multinomial
logit.
To render the results of the multinomial logits more easily interpretable, the
results section below presents predicted probabilities for the Disinformation and
Non-disinformation outcomes across the ranges of the independent variables. We
also present an additional quantity of interest, deﬁned as follows:

( | ) =
( )
( ) + ( − )
( )Pr Disinfo Any info Pr Disinfo
Pr Disinfo Pr Non Disinfo
3
We calculated the quantity as the predicted probability of exposure to disinfor-
mation (conditional on covariate values), as a share of the predicted probability of
exposure to any type of information (conditional on covariate values). The quantity
captures the intuition: out of all the information about the MH17 crash available to
the individual, what proportion is likely to be disinformation? Presenting this con-
ditional probability highlights that, while the estimated probability of exposure to
either type of information was relatively rare for most individuals, the composition
of types of information could and did vary considerably.
Results
Here, we present the results of estimating the models described above. After pre-
senting how followers’ ideology and demographics are associated with exposure to
disinformation, we present a qualitative look at the most inﬂuential accounts in the
data, providing additional face validity to the proposed interpretation of the
ﬁndings.
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Followers’ ideology
Table 2 presents results from estimating Equation 1 on the known ideology set. We
present the results with No information as the reference category. Relative to No
information, ideology is negatively related with exposure to Non-disinformation
and positively related to Disinformation. In other words, relative to not being
exposed to any MH17 discussion, more conservative individuals were less likely to
be exposed to non-disinformation and more likely to be exposed to disinformation.
Because of the inclusion of the squared term in the speciﬁcation, the coeﬃcients are
not easily interpretable in isolation. Figure 2 visualizes the results in a more intuitive
form, by plotting predicted probabilities across the range of the ideology variable.
As indicated by the solid blue line in Figure 2, exposure to non-disinformation
has a curvilinear relationship with ideology, such that individuals at the extremes
were more likely to be exposed to non-disinformation (compared to no informa-
tion) about the MH17 crash. This result dovetails with existing studies that found
that more ideologically extreme individuals are more likely to consume political
news (Arceneaux & Johnson, 2013). However, the predicted probability of exposure
to disinformation had a quite diﬀerent trajectory, hovering around zero at the left
end and turning sharply upwards at the right end of the ideological spectrum. In
other words, while exposure to non-disinformation was symmetrically concentrated
at the ideological extremes, exposure to disinformation is ideologically asymmetric,
concentrated among the most conservative individuals. This pattern corresponds
with Guess, Nyhan, and Reiﬂer (2018), who found exposure to misinformation to
be concentrated in the most conservative decile of users.
The dashed black line in Figure 2 shows the conditional probability of disinfor-
mation exposure, as described in Equation 3. Because disinformation exposure is
concentrated at the right end of the spectrum, the conditional probability slopes
sharply upwards. For the most liberal individuals in the data, the conditional proba-
bility of exposure to disinformation was 6.5%. For the most conservative individuals
in the data, the probability was 45.2%. The results indicate a clear ideological asym-
metry in the reach of online pro-Russian disinformation.
One notable feature of the measure of followers’ ideology is that it is strongly
right-skewed, with an outlier cluster of followers on the far-right end of the scale.
We present a density plot of the distribution in the Supplementary Appendix B. We
also show that our results are robust to estimating Equation 1 with this cluster omit-
ted from the data.
Followers’ demographic characteristics
We now turn to followers’ demographic characteristics: estimating Equation 2 on
the user demographics set. Our results are shown in Table 3.
Because registering as a Republican was post-treatment to the other variables,
the coeﬃcients on these variables in the full speciﬁcation were subject to a post-
treatment adjustment bias. To show the consequences of various speciﬁcation
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Intercept −2.11* −4.20* −2.92* −5.15*
(.00) (.00) (.00) (.00)
Estimated ideology −.10* .22* −.18* .06*
(.00) (.00) (.00) (.00)
Estimated ideology2 .05* .08* .06* .13*
(.00) (.00) (.00) (.00)
Political ﬁgures
followed
– – .08* .09*
– – (.00) (.00)
AIC 10,533,507.22 10,533,507.22 9,974,905.91 9,974,905.91
BIC 10,533,593.20 10,533,593.20 9,975,020.55 9,975,020.55
Log likelihood −5,266,747.61 −5,266,747.61 −4,987,444.96 −4,987,444.96
Deviance 10,533,495.22 10,533,495.22 9,974,889.91 9,974,889.91
Number observed 12,361,427 12,361,427 12,361,427 12,361,427
Note: *p < .001.
AIC: Akaike information criterion; BIC: Bayesian information criterion.
Non−disinfo
Disinfo
















Figure 2 Predicted probabilities of exposure to types of information across the observed
range of estimated ideology. The ideology measure is standardized, so values on the x-axis
represent standard deviations from the mean of estimated ideology. The solid blue line plots
the probabilities for non-disinformation. The dotted red line plots the probabilities for disin-
formation. The dashed black line plots the probability of disinformation exposure, condi-
tional on exposure to any information. The gray bands represent 95% conﬁdence intervals.
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Table 3 Demographic Predictors of Potential Exposure
Non-disinformation Disinformation Non-disinformation Disinformation Non-disinformation Disinformation
Intercept −3.15* −6.50* −5.19* −9.05* −4.94* −9.14*
(.02) (.05) (.03) (.10) (.04) (.10)
Republican −.69* 3.49* – – −1.32* .96*
(.08) (.16) – – (.07) (.15)
Male – – .68* 1.35* .72* 1.29*
– – (.04) (.10) (.03) (.10)
Age 40+ – – 3.35* 5.64* 3.46* 5.40*
– – (.05) (.13) (.05) (.14)
AIC 154,614.64 154,614.64 147,239.10 147,239.10 146,808.47 146,808.47
BIC 154,658.63 154,658.63 147,305.06 147,305.06 146,896.42 146,896.42
Log likelihood −77,303.32 −77,303.32 −73,613.55 −73,613.55 −73,396.24 −73,396.24
Deviance 154,606.64 154,606.64 147,227.10 147,227.10 146,792.47 146,792.47
Number observed 441,261 441,261 439,739 439,739 439,734 439,734
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choices, Table 3 also presents a bivariate model with only party registration and a
model with party registration excluded.
The ﬁrst two columns in Table 3 present a result that aligns closely with the
ﬁndings for ideology: individuals registered as Republicans were less likely to be
exposed to non-disinformation and more likely to be exposed to disinformation.
This pattern of opposite-sign coeﬃcients is, in fact, unique for party registration.
In the full model, presented in columns 5 and 6, the patterns for the demo-
graphic variables were eﬀectively unchanged (all remain signiﬁcant). However, com-
pared to the bivariate speciﬁcation, the coeﬃcient on Republican party registration
with respect to disinformation exposure was sharply diminished, suggesting that the
higher probability of disinformation exposure among Republicans in part reﬂects
the background characteristics associated with registering as Republican.
Figure 3 presents predicted and conditional probabilities for each of the demo-
graphic variables. As shown, the predicted probabilities of potential exposure to any
kind of information were low and relatively invariant. The exception from this pat-
tern is age, where there was a noticeable uptick in the predicted probability for indi-
viduals predicted to be age 40 or older. This ﬁnding aligns with Guess et al. (2018),
who found that older U.S. Americans were much more likely to visit fake news web-
sites during the 2016 U.S. presidential election.
For the bivariate model with Republican party registration (bottom left panel),
Republican-registered individuals were less likely to be exposed to non-
disinformation and more likely to be exposed to disinformation. Consequently, the
conditional probability of exposure to disinformation sloped very steeply upwards.
For individuals not registered as Republican, the conditional probability of exposure
to disinformation was 3.4%. For individuals registered as Republican, the condi-
tional probability was 69.7%. This mirrors the association we observed for ideology,
only stronger.
For Republican party registration in the full model (bottom right panel), the
results were similar overall, albeit without the uptick for disinformation for the
highest values, the same result captured by the insigniﬁcant coeﬃcient in Table 3.
In conjunction with the results for the demographic variables, this suggests that the
higher conditional probability of exposure to disinformation for conservative and
Republican individuals reﬂected, to a signiﬁcant extent, age diﬀerences in exposure
to disinformation, as well as ideology and party registration.
Understanding the mechanism: Inﬂuential accounts
While the analysis thus far had established a link between twitter users’ ideology
and exposure to disinformation, the mechanisms of the association remained
unclear. Speciﬁcally, who were the original disseminators of the disinformation that
reached conservative audiences in particular?
To shed light on this, we turned our attention to the accounts behind the 10,000
annotated tweets. Since some accounts occurred more than once in the tweet sub-
sample, the subsample contained information on 8,575 unique accounts. Within
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this set, we zeroed in on a set of accounts that were particularly likely to be driving
the relationship between user ideology and exposure to disinformation. We refer to
these as high-inﬂuence accounts.
An account that played a key role in driving the ideological asymmetry in expo-
sure to disinformation would need to have fulﬁlled three of these criteria in order to
disseminate disinformation to a large, ideologically distinct audience. Firstly, we
deﬁned high-inﬂuence accounts by a large followership, operationalized as a num-
ber of followers in the top decile of the distribution. In our data, this cutoﬀ appeared
at 1,916 followers. Secondly, we deﬁned high-inﬂuence accounts by an ideologically
distinct followership, operationalized as an average user ideology in the most
extreme decile, either liberal or conservative. Users in our data were in the most lib-
eral decile if they had an average user ideology score of less than .297, and in the
most conservative decile if they had a score above .133 (since the ideology score was
standardized, these scores are expressed in terms of standard deviations in the full
distribution of user ideology). Thirdly, we limited high-inﬂuence accounts to those
disseminating disinformation, operationalized as having sent out at least one tweet
containing disinformation, as annotated in our data.
The accounts captured in this deﬁnition were thus highly inﬂuential in a dual
sense: because of their ideological skew and dissemination of disinformation, they





















Non−disinfo Disinfo Disinfo | Any info
Figure 3 Predicted probabilities of exposure to disinformation for demographic variables.
The probabilities are all based on the full model in columns 5 and 6 of Table 3, except the
panel in the bottom right-hand corner, which is based on the bivariate model in columns 1
and 2. The gray bands represent 95% conﬁdence intervals.
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had a high degree of statistical leverage on the relationship between ideology and
exposure to disinformation shown above. Owing to their large numbers of fol-
lowers, these accounts were also inﬂuential in the more intuitive sense of reaching a
large online audience. The top panel of Figure 4 illustrates the selection process.
In the bottom two panels of Figure 4, we present close-ups of the areas
highlighted in the top panel, showing select liberal (left panel) and conservative
(right panel) high-inﬂuence accounts. As shown, the sets of high-inﬂuence accounts
mirrored the ﬁnding of ideological asymmetry from above. Whereas the criteria
captured 25 accounts on the liberal side of the ideological spectrum, the same crite-
ria captured 52 accounts on the conservative side of the spectrum. In other words,
the density of widely followed accounts disseminating disinformation was consider-
ably higher on the conservative end of the spectrum, compared to the liberal end.
A qualitative examination of the speciﬁc accounts in the high-inﬂuence sets pro-
vided some additional face validation. Particularly high-inﬂuence accounts on the
conservative side included CristophHeer52 and Ian56789, both high-frequency
English-language accounts consistently tweeting pro-Russian messages, a pattern
consistent with the behavior of pro-Russian bot or troll accounts (Sanovich, Stukal,
& Tucker, 2018; Stukal, Sanovich, Bonneau, & Tucker, 2017). However, the conser-
vative side also included accounts originating in domestic U.S. politics, such as the
libertarian account LibertarianWing, and TwitchyTeam, a news aggregator estab-
lished by the conservative commentator Michelle Malkin. On the liberal side, some
of the accounts, such as RafaelStepanian and Paul1Singh, appeared to be troll-like
accounts, tweeting left-wing messages with very high frequencies. In contrast to the
conservative side, no large news outlets or online communities appeared on the lib-
eral side. This pattern is consistent with previous research ﬁnding a distinct, right-
wing media ecosystem to be particularly susceptible to disinformation (Benkler,
Faris, Roberts, & Zuckerman, 2017).
Conclusion and discussion
This paper examined the reach of online pro-Russian disinformation using a case-
based approach analyzing the discussion of the MH17 crash over eastern Ukraine
on Twitter. Consistent with the ideological asymmetry hypothesis, we found that
exposure to disinformation was concentrated among the most conservative indivi-
duals. In other words, the reach of online pro-Russian disinformation into U.S.
audiences was distinctly ideologically asymmetric. In a follow-up analysis of high-
inﬂuence accounts disseminating disinformation, we found a corresponding asym-
metry, in that high-inﬂuence accounts in the most conservative decile, in terms of
audience ideology, outnumbered liberal accounts by about two to one. Our study
thus provides (one of) the ﬁrst systematic investigations into who is most exposed
to pro-Russian digital disinformation.
Our results show, on the one hand, that in absolute terms, the degree of expo-
sure to disinformation for most Twitter users is limited. This is in line with a recent
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study showing that Russian Twitter accounts contributed relatively little to the
Brexit debate (Narayanan, Howard, Kollanyi, & Elswah, 2017). On the other hand,
in relative terms, the exposure is concentrated among a particular, ideologically dis-
tinct segment, in which the potential exposure to disinformation is considerable for
some individuals.
This conclusion comes with some important caveats. For one, our research
design did not allow for directly observing exposure, but only potential exposure, as
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Figure 4 Panel a shows the full distribution of the average ideology of followers and the
number of followers for accounts in the tweet subsample. To avoid overplotting, the full dis-
tribution of the data is binned. The dots in the dashed rectangles are accounts tweeting dis-
information, with numbers of followers in the top decile and average user ideology in the
most liberal or conservative deciles. Panel b provides close-ups of the top left rectangle in
panel a: that is, liberal, high-inﬂuence accounts. Panel c provides close-ups of the top right
rectangle in panel a: that is, conservative, high-inﬂuence accounts. The gray rectangles show
the distribution of accounts not tweeting disinformation.
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equilibrium in the market for online disinformation. As a consequence, we cannot
disentangle the separate eﬀects of “demand-side” vis-à-vis “supply-side” factors.
Here, experimental approaches, like recent work using Twitter bots to distribute
treatments (e.g., Munger, 2017), may provide analytical leverage.
Another signiﬁcant caveat is the time gap between the MH17 crash in 2014 and
our collection of follower data in 2016. Although we found no evidence of changes
in the ideological compositions of followers after the crash (see Supplementary
Appendix D), a stronger research design could close this time gap by implementing
our sampling, coding, and data retrieval procedure in the immediate wake of an
event giving rise to disinformation.
Lastly, as in all case-based approaches, case representativity is a relevant con-
cern. We only focused on a population of U.S. Twitter users, representing a limited
and more polarized audience when it comes to the global exposure to pro-Russian
digital disinformation. While 24% of U.S. adults say they use Twitter (Smith &
Anderson, 2018), studies have shown an overrepresentation of urban, young, male
users, whereas representations of race and ideology are more uncertain (Barberá &
Rivero, 2015). Future research may evaluate the representativity of this case by con-
ducting analyses on both similar cases and diﬀerent cases, including already polar-
ized issues within the West.
These reservations notwithstanding, our study highlights important conse-
quences of the disruptive communication processes often identiﬁed as key constitu-
ents of the “fourth age of political communication” (Blumler, 2013). These
processes contribute to the breakdown of traditional media systems, but also form a
new media system, characterized by “disrupted public spheres” (Bennett & Pfetsch,
2018, p. 245). Our study suggests that one important manifestation of this system is
the ideologically uneven spread of online disinformation.
While our study thus, in many respects, complements theories of political com-
munication in this “fourth age,” it challenges them in others. Speciﬁcally, our ﬁnd-
ings question the notion that greater media choice leads to inequalities in factual
political knowledge between more and less politically engaged citizens (e.g., Bennett
& Iyengar, 2008; Holbert, Garrett, & Gleason, 2010; Prior, 2005). Paradoxically, the
presence of mis- and disinformation in online media environments implies that
engaged citizens’ information searches may, in some cases, diminish rather than
increase their factual knowledge. This complicates not only theories of political
communication, but also widely subscribed recipes for informed democratic citizen-
ship. Understanding the causes and consequences of online ﬂows of mis- and disin-
formation remains a crucial task for scholars of political communication.
Supplementary Material
Supplementary material are available at Journal of Communication online.
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